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As the country profiles gathered in this volume illustrate, policies concerning choice, 
autonomy, and accountability in national school systems have profound implications 
for the degree of freedom exercised by families and by those operating schools. Yet 
an equally important consideration for policymakers seeking to strike the right 
balance in this area may be the consequences of alternative arrangements for schools’ 
success in raising student achievement. 
 
International evidence shows a strong positive association between the quality of 
schooling, as measured by student performance on achievement tests, and long-run 
economic growth across countries (Hanushek and Woessmann 2008, 2011). 
HOW SCHOOL CHOICE, AUTONOMY, AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IMPACT STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT: 
INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE 
 by Martin R. West and  
Ludger Woessmann 
 
Moreover, ample data confirms that simply investing more resources in national 
school systems as currently configured is unlikely to improve student achievement 
substantially (Hanushek and Woessmann 2011).i 
 
The institutional environment in which schools operate, on the other hand, may make 
all the difference. Economic theory suggests that the performance of a given industry 
will reflect the incentives that actors within it face. That is, if the actors in an 
education system are rewarded (extrinsically or intrinsically) for producing better 
student performance, and if they are penalized for failing to do so, this will over time 
lead to superior outcomes. The incentives to produce high-quality education, in turn, 
are determined by the education system’s institutions – the rules and regulations that 
set rewards and penalties for all those who are involved in the educational process 
and govern their ability to respond to those rewards and penalties. 
 
Although parents’ freedom to choose private schools, the autonomy of school staff to 
make independent decisions, and the extent of accountability in the education system 
have all been argued to be important for student outcomes, empirical evidence on 
their effects has been hard to come by. This reflects the fact that policies in these areas 
often do not vary within countries. For example, external exam systems, which are 
one mechanism to provide accountability for student outcomes, tend to be a national 
policy, so that they are either present in the whole country or not at all.ii Furthermore, 
policies such as the freedom to choose private schools may have a systemic impact, 
affecting not only the individual students who do so but also the performance of 
public schools that are exposed to greater competition. 
 
The research reviewed in this chapter looks at a different kind of variation in the 
prevalence of choice, autonomy, and accountability: variation across countries. It 
asks, for example, whether students as a whole perform better in countries where 
parents have ample choice to send their children to privately operated schools. And 
it explores whether the answer to that question depends on the autonomy schools 
have to manage their own affairs and the extent to which they and their students are 
held accountable for their performance. To answer these questions, we draw on data 
from several recent international student achievement tests, which provide 
comparable information on student achievement for many countries. By examining 
data across a large sample of countries, we are able to suggest what countries can 
learn from each other about the effects of school choice, autonomy, and accountability 
on student outcomes. 
 
 
Studying institutional effects on student achievement 
 
Why would we expect, from a theoretical point of view, that institutions that introduce 
choice, autonomy, and accountability might have an effect on student learning? The 
background of these considerations is that in the private business sector, market 
competition tends to discipline firms to work effectively because they would otherwise fail 
to profit. Inefficiency leads to higher costs and higher prices – practically an invitation to 
competitors to lure away customers. 
 
However, countries around the world generally finance and operate the great majority of 
their schools publicly (Pritchett 2003). This relative lack of competition in the compulsory 
education sector tends to dull incentives to improve quality and restrain costs (Hanushek 
et al. 1994). Moreover, in the public system, the ability of parents and students to ensure 
that they receive a high-quality education is often constrained by obstacles to leaving bad 
schools. 
 
Institutions that ensure informed choice among autonomous schools may therefore be 
expected to create incentives for school personnel to use their resources in ways that 
maximize student learning.iii The choice that different institutions can introduce is not 
limited to the choice for parents in terms of the availability of privately operated schools. 
It also includes, for example, choice for schools and teachers in the public sector to make 
autonomous decisions. Likewise, accountability may be aimed at schools or at students, 
through such institutional features as external exit examinations and regular monitoring 
of student progress by tests and exams. 
 
 
Gathering evidence on the effects of institutions 
 
How can we test whether these hypothesized effects of competition, autonomy, and 
accountability prevail in the real world? And how can we determine whether these 
effects are large enough to warrant attention? Studying institutional effects requires 
variation in institutional factors that is often not present within a single country. This 
is most apparent in the case of system-wide central exams, which by definition are 
administered either for virtually all students in the system or for none. There is 
therefore no way to provide evidence on the effects of this institution on student 
achievement based on data from within a single country. Because most education 
policy research tends to focus on individual countries, the potentially important 
effects of choice and accountability tend to be missed. By contrast, the approach taken 
in the research reviewed in this chapter is to exploit the substantial variation in 
institutional arrangement that exists across countries (Hanushek and Woessmann 
2011). Some countries have central exam systems, others do not. Some countries have 
many non-state (private) schools, others hardly any. This kind of variation is essential 
in order to analyze which institutional factors are associated with higher levels of 
student achievement. 
 
Even so, the internationally comparative approach suffers from a number of 
limitations. First, the limited number of country observations that can be included in 
any one analysis often precludes in-depth analyses of the details of implementation 
which are likely to be crucial in determining a given policy’s real- world impact. More 
importantly, there are limits to the causal interpretation of international analyses. To 
the extent that the international variation in institutional features is associated with 
other unobserved country features, the empirical associations can only provide a 
biased picture of the actual causal relationships. Therefore, the results reported in 
this chapter control in an unusually extensive form for differences in the 
characteristics of students, schools and countries. This approach holds numerous 
variables of family background, material and personnel endowment of schools, and 
levels of per-capita income and educational expenditure of countries constant. 
 
Accounting for observable influences allows a comparison of students, schools, and 
countries which are equivalent to one another in terms of these determinants. Still, 
the international student achievement tests provide observational data, in which 
institutional features are not divided between randomly chosen treatment and 
control groups. Insofar as institutional features stand in a wider cultural context and 
have crucial historical roots, the associations reported here will inevitably include 
such unobserved differences across countries and may not correspond to the direct 
causal effects of introducing a new institutional feature in a specific country. 
However, where appropriate we also discuss the results of quasi-experimental studies 
which support the evidence of institutional effects we observe across countries. 
 
 
The data: international student achievement tests 
 
The data that enable the cross-country identification of institutional effects are 
international student achievement tests. These tests quantify the educational 
performance of students in subjects such as math, science, and reading by using the 
same test items in all participating countries. Thus, they provide measures of 
educational performance that are directly comparable across countries. Furthermore, 
by using representative sampling methods to draw random samples of schools, all the 
international student achievement tests used in this chapter provide representative 
samples of students in each participating country. 
 
In particular, the research summarized in this chapter uses data from several recent 
international student achievement tests. The first one is the Third International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), conducted in 1995 with data released in 
1997. TIMSS was conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of 
Educational Achievement (IEA), an independent cooperation of national research 
institutes and governmental research agencies. TIMSS targeted representative 
samples of students in the two adjacent grades with the largest share of 13-year-olds 
(usually 7th and 8th grade). For the analyses conducted in this chapter, TIMSS 
yielded internationally comparable data for 266,545 students from 6,107 schools in 
39 countries (for details, see Woessmann 2003a and the references therein). Second, 
the IEA replicated the TIMSS test in 1999 under the name TIMSS-Repeat, with data 
released in 2001. TIMSS-Repeat targeted the upper of the two grades tested in TIMSS 
(usually the 8th grade), covering 180,544 students in 38 countries (see Woessmann 
2003b and the references therein). The sample of participating countries differed 
considerably between the two tests, so that the pooled TIMSS/TIMSS-Repeat 
database contains 54 different countries (447,089 students). 
 
Third, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
conducted the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) in 2000, 
with data released in 2002, which targeted fifteen-year-old students. The PISA 2000 
database covers 175,227 students in reading (96,855 in math, 96,758 in science) in 32 
countries (see Fuchs and Woessmann 2007 and the references therein). Fourth, the 
OECD administered a second wave of the PISA study in 2003, with data released in 
2005. The PISA 2003 database covers up to 265,878 students in mathematics in 37 
countries (see Woessmann, Luedemann, Schuetz, and West 2009 and the references 
therein). Fifth, the recent study by Hanushek, Link, and Woessmann (2011) pools the 
data from all four available waves of PISA tests – 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009 – to 
pursue panel analyses with 1,042,995 students in 42 countries that cover 155 country-
by-wave observations in mathematics (and similar samples in science and reading). 
Sixth, in 2001 the IEA conducted the Progress in International Reading Literacy 
Study (PIRLS), with data released in 2003. While the focus of the previous studies 
was on secondary schools, PIRLS tested the reading performance of 140,626 primary-
school students in 35 countries (see Fuchs and Woessmann 2005 and the references 
therein). The target population of PIRLS was the upper of the two grades with the 
highest share of 9-year-olds of a country (usually the 4th grade). 
 
The question addressed in the studies reviewed in this chapter is whether, on average, 
the countries performing better than the mean of countries on the different 
international tests feature an institutional set-up of their education systems that gives 
a bigger role to private schools, autonomy, and accountability, after holding constant 
other influence factors such as parental background, the development level of a 
country, and the mean educational expenditure per student of a country. 
 
 
The empirical model: multiple student-level cross-country 
regressions 
 
However, the research described in this chapter does not merely compare aggregate 
performance levels across countries. Rather, it analyzes performance at the level of 
the individual student, using individual student-level data not only on educational 
performance in math, science, and reading, but also combining it with extensive 
background information on other potential influence factors. These include dozens 
of indicators of family background, mostly taken from student background 
questionnaires (and parental background questionnaires in the case of primary-
school PIRLS); several indicators of the resource endowment of the specific class or 
school, mostly taken from teacher and school background questionnaires; and several 
indicators of institutional features of the school systems, mostly taken from school 
background questionnaires. The latter include our primary measures of the extent of 
choice, autonomy, and accountability in the specific school of each tested student. 
 
Using these extensive student-level data, each of the studies discussed below 
estimates a variant of the following empirical model: 
 
Tisc = Biscα + Rsc β + I sc γ + ε isc 
 
In this specification, Tisc is the achievement test score of student i in school s in 
country c. B is a vector of student background data (including student characteristics, 
family background and home inputs), and R is a vector of data on schools’ resource 
endowments. I is a vector of institutional characteristics. The parameter vectors α, 
β, and γ are estimated in microeconometric cross-country regressions performed at 
the level of individual students i. Thus, sample sizes are roughly between 100,000 
and 450,000 students on the different tests (see above).iv 
 
While the γ coefficient estimates are our primary interest in this review, the general 
pattern of results on the effect of family background and resource endowments should be 
acknowledged. All studies confirm very strong family-background effects on educational 
performance, with students from better-educated families and with higher socio-
economic status performing substantially better (see, e.g., Woessmann 2003a; Fuchs and 
Woessmann 2005, 2007; Schuetz, Ursprung and Woessmann 2008). By contrast, most 
studies usually find no consistent effect of resource endowments (see, e.g., Woessmann 
2002, 2005b; Woessmann and West 2006; Hanushek 2003). Students in countries with 
higher spending levels or smaller classes do not tend to perform better than students in 
less well equipped countries. This pattern suggests that increased financial investment in 
education is unlikely on its own to improve student achievement and provides additional 
motivation for considering the effects of institutions. 
 
 
International evidence on institutional effects 
 
In this section, we review evidence from studies that have taken the approach just described 
to examine the effects of school choice, autonomy, and accountability on student 
achievement across countries, controlling for differences in family background and the 
level of resources devoted to education. We pay particular attention to evidence concerning 
how the effects of these institutions may work in complementary ways. What do studies 
based on international achievement tests tell us about the effects of institutional features 
on the quality of schooling?v 
 
 
Competition through public funding for privately operated 
schools 
 
Privately operated schools provide choice for parents and competition for public schools, 
which economic theory. Standard economic models of industrial organization suggest 
that competition and choice create incentives that improve performance. Theoretical 
applications of this logic to the market for education are numerous, often with differing 
focuses and conflicting predictions concerning the likely consequences for the equity of 
student outcomes.vi However, these models generally suggest that additional choice and 
competition can create incentives for cost containment and performance-enhancing 
innovation by allowing parents to choose those schools that will be most effective for their 
child. 
 
Empirical evidence from international achievement tests confirms that students perform 
better in countries where more schools are privately operated. For example, students 
scored 10 test-score points better in TIMSS math, and 9 in TIMSS science, if the share of 
enrollment in privately managed schools of a country was one international standard 
deviation (or 14 percentage points) higher (see Woessmann 2003a).vii Considering that 
one grade-level equivalent (the average performance difference between 7th and 8th 
grade) was roughly equal to 40 points on the TIMSS test, these effects are substantial. For 
example, students in countries that had a private school sector that was 28 percentage 
points larger (as measured by the enrollment share) performed better by the equivalent 
of half a year’s learning. 
 
In addition to private enrollment, students in countries with a higher share of public 
educational spending going to private institutions performed better. If the share of public 
funds going to independent private schools rose by one percentage point (or one 
international standard deviation), there was a 10-point increase in math achievement. In 
sum, student performance seems to be higher in education systems where taxpayers’ 
money is allocated to private schools rather than to the public schooling system alone. 
 
The evidence discussed so far, using TIMSS data, is based on country-wide measures of 
the extent of private schooling. This does not allow for a direct assessment of the relative 
performance of public and private schools, because TIMSS does not provide school-level 
data on whether individual tested schools are public or private. However, measuring the 
system-level effect of private school operation may be the most appropriate way to 
estimate the general systemic effect of the competitive environment prevailing in different 
education systems, because increased competition from private schools may also 
positively impact on the effectiveness of resource use in nearby public schools. 
 
By contrast, the PISA studies provide specific school-level data on public versus private 
operation and financing. In particular, in PISA there is information for each tested school 
both on whether the school is privately or publicly operated and on how large its share of 
public funding is. Public school operation is defined as schools managed directly or 
indirectly by a public education authority, government agency or governing board 
appointed by government or elected by public franchise, whereas private school operation 
is defined as schools managed directly or indirectly by a non-government organization, 
for example a church, trade union, business, or other private institutions. The share of 
public funding is defined as the percentage of total school funding coming from 
government sources (at different levels), as opposed to such private contributions as fees 
and donations. 
 
Looking across all countries, the result is that students perform better if their specific 
school is privately operated. The size of the performance difference between privately and 
publicly operated schools is between 16 and 20 PISA test- score points in the three 
different subjects in PISA 2000 (Fuchs and Woessmann 2007), and the same result is 
found in PISA 2003 (Woessmann et al. 2009). This pattern is not uniform across 
countries, however (Woessmann 2009b). Woessmann et al. (2009) find that students in 
privately operated schools also score better on certain non-cognitive outcomes, such as 
reduced disruptive behavior and tardiness. However, one should be cautious when 
interpreting these results based on micro-level variation within countries, as there may 
be self-selection of students with different capabilities into private schools. While many 
features of self-selection will be held constant by the family-background controls included 
in each analysis, some self-selection bias due to unobserved heterogeneity of students 
likely remains. 
 
Woessmann (2009b) and Woessmann et al. (2009) provide a more in-depth analysis of 
the effects of private versus public operation and financing of schools in PISA 2000 and 
2003, respectively, measuring these features mostly at the country level. This approach 
makes it possibly to capture systemic effects where both private and public schools may 
perform at a higher level because of the existence of private competition. If public schools 
behave differently because there are private schools nearby, there may be effects of private 
involvement even though the performance of individual private and public schools does 
not differ at the level of schools. The results show again that countries with a larger share 
of privately operated schools perform better. Importantly, however, larger shares of 
public funding (as opposed to operation) are associated with better student outcomes 
both in PISA 2000 and in PISA 2003. This pattern is evident in Figure 1, which shows 
that countries which combine relatively high shares of private operation with relatively 
high shares of funding from government sources do best among all possible operation-
funding combinations. Countries which combine public operation with private funding 
do worst. 
 




Note: Based on cross-country student-level multiple regressions using the PISA 2003 
micro database. “Low” and “high” refer to the first and ninth decile on the international 
distribution of the two variables (0% and 55% in the case of private operation and 55% 
and 100% in the case of government funding). Source: Woessmann et al. (2009). 
 
Furthermore, the performance advantage of privately operated schools over publicly 
operated schools is particularly strong in countries with large shares of public funding 
(Woessmann 2009b). This suggests that greater public funding may increase the choices 
available to poor families. Without public funding, poor families may be constrained in 
their choices because they do not have the financial means to opt for private schooling. In 
these cases, public funding may help families to exert their choices in terms of privately 
managed schools, so that the positive effect of public funding may be another aspect of 
the skill-enhancing capacity of school choice and competition. 
 
Consistent with this reasoning, Woessmann et al. (2009) find that students in countries 
where public funding is equalized between privately and publicly operated schools 
perform significantly better than students in countries where privately operated schools 
receive less government funding than publicly operated schools. In other words, a level 
financial playing field between public and private schools seems to create an environment 
of choice and competition that raises student achievement. Woessmann et al. (2009) also 
show that a larger difference between private and public schools in the share of 
government funding is detrimental for the equality of educational opportunity: 
Government funding of private schools benefits students with low socioeconomic status 
more than students with high socioeconomic status. Taken at face value, then, evidence 
from cross-country studies based on the TIMSS and PISA suggests that school systems 
based on public-private partnerships where the state finances schools but contracts their 
operation out to the private sector are most effective in terms of producing student 
achievement. 
 
One potential concern with this evidence, however, is that countries with large private 
school sectors may differ in unobserved ways from the countries with which they are being 
compared. Countries where more people choose to invest in private education may have 
other attributes, such as higher income levels of a greater commitment to education, that 
lead to better achievement. If this is the case, any positive correlation between private 
schooling and student achievement could reflect a country’s income or educational 
commitment rather than any beneficial effects of competition. Alternatively, it may be the 
case that low-quality public schools increase the demand for private schooling. If so, then 
the results just discussed may understate the role of competitive effects. 
 
West and Woessmann (2010) address this concern by taking advantage of the historical 
fact that the size of the private education sector varies from one country to another for 
reasons that have little to do with national income, commitment to education, or 
contemporary school quality. In particular, the extent of private schooling today stems in 
large part from the Catholic Church’s decision in the 19th Century to build an alternative 
system of education wherever they were unable to control schools operated by the state. 
Their results, based on 29 developed democracies which participated in PISA 2003, 
confirm that the share of schools that are privately operated has an economically and 
statistically significant positive effect on student achievement in mathematics, science, 
and reading. Importantly, much of the positive effect accrues to students in public 
schools, suggesting that the overall effect is not simply due to privately operated schools 
being more effective, but rather reflects beneficial effects of competition. Finally, they also 
show that more private school competition reduces educational expenditure per student, 
so that better educational outcomes are obtained at lower cost.viii 
 
Even so, there are important caveats to keep in mind when considering policy proposals 
to expand educational choice. Critics fear that wider choice could increase stratification 
along lines of ability, ethnicity, or socio-economic status and have adverse consequences 
for disadvantaged students (e.g., Burgess, McConnell, Propper and Wilson 2007; Cullen, 
Jacob and Levitt 2005; Ladd 2002). Others argue that a universal voucher system would 
create considerable administrative costs that are ignored by most analysts (Levin 1998). 
While much more research is needed before we fully understand the dynamics of 
competition in education and the conditions which determine its effects, the available 
evidence suggests that the use of competition from private educational providers, 
combined with public funding of schools, can increase the efficiency with which students 





A characteristic that often distinguishes privately operated schools is greater 
autonomy in decision making. In the international analyses, the effects of the private 
versus public operation have been disentangled from effects of differential autonomy 
of schools. The extent of autonomy that schools have constitutes a separate set of 
institutional features that depicts the extent to which schools and teachers are free to 
make their own choices. Economic models contrasting centralized and decentralized 
school operation suggest that greater autonomy can lead to increased efficiency by 
allowing schools to draw on local knowledge to respond to family needs.ix 
 
The overall pattern of findings from international tests concerning the effects of 
school autonomy indicates that students perform at significantly higher levels in 
schools that have more flexibility in process and personnel decisions (Woessmann 
2003a; Fuchs and Woessmann 2005, 2007; Woessmann et al. 2009). These decisions 
include such areas as the purchase of supplies and budget allocations within schools, 
hiring and rewarding teachers (within a fixed budget), and choosing textbooks and 
instructional methods. That is, there are positive average effects of allowing both 
primary and secondary schools more autonomy in these specific decision-making 
areas. 
 
Hanushek, Link, and Woessmann (2011) have refined our understanding of the 
effects of autonomy in a recent study that uses all four PISA waves from 2000 to 2009 
to exploit variation in average school autonomy within each participating country 
over time. Their analysis suggests that local autonomy indeed has an important 
impact on student achievement, but this impact varies systematically across 
countries, depending on the level of economic and educational development: 
Countries with otherwise strong institutions gain considerably from decentralized 
decision-making in their schools, while countries that lack such a strong existing 
structure may actually be hurt by decentralizing decision- making. The result holds 
across different decision-making areas but is generally stronger with regard to 
matters of academic content (curriculum, texts, etc.) and weaker with regard to 
budgetary decisions. In particular, the negative effect in developing countries is less 
pronounced for autonomy in the areas of personnel and budgets and emerges most 
clearly for autonomy in areas relating to academic content. 
 
Woessmann et al. (2009) also show that there are strong positive interactions 
between private school operation and the average extent of autonomy that schools 
have in a country: Privately operated schools perform even better if schools in the 
system are autonomous in formulating the budget and in staffing decisions. The 
incentives created by parental choice of private schools thus work particularly well if 
(private and public) schools in the system have autonomy to respond to parental 
demands. In such systems, privately operated schools face particularly strong 
incentives to perform well. 
 
 
Accountability through external exams 
 
Principal-agent models of educational production predict that setting clear 
performance standards and providing performance information can tilt incentives in 
favor of superior student performance (see, e.g., Costrell 1994; Betts 1998). By 
signaling student performance to potential employers on the labor market, external 
school-leaving exams increase students’ rewards for learning as well as parents’ scope 
for monitoring the education process, which should ultimately improve student 
performance (see, e.g., Bishop and Woessmann 2004; Bishop 2006). The 
accountability introduced by external exams can help to face the challenge for the 
institutional set-up of school systems to create a set of incentives that encourages 
school personnel to behave in ways that do not necessarily further their own interests, 
but rather the interest of best student learning. For instance, without the right 
incentives, teachers may avoid using the most promising teaching techniques, 
preferring to use the techniques they find most convenient. If a country assesses the 
performance of students with some sort of external exam and uses this information to 
monitor teachers, teachers may put aside their other interests and focus mainly on raising 
student achievement. In sum, testing performance can lead to better-informed choices and 
make students and educational providers accountable for what they learn and teach.x 
 
Evidence from the international student achievement tests is again consistent with 
this reasoning. Students perform substantially better in countries that have external 
exit-exam systems than in countries without external exit-exam systems. This is true 
in TIMSS, TIMSS-Repeat, PISA 2000, and PISA 2003 (see Woessmann 2003a, 
2003b, 2005a; Fuchs and Woessmann 2007; Woessmann et al. 2009), as well as in 
other previous international achievement tests (see also Bishop 1997, 2006). Taken 
as a whole, the evidence suggests that the effect may well be larger than a full grade-
level equivalent. 
 
Similarly, students perform better where parents take interest in teaching matters, 
suggesting positive effects of parents holding schools and children accountable 
(Woessmann 2003a). Also, both primary and secondary school students perform 
better where teachers use regular tests and exams to monitor student progress (Fuchs 
and Woessmann 2005, 2007). In addition, students perform better in schools and 
countries with accountability measures aimed at teachers, such as internal and 
external monitoring of teacher lessons, and with accountability measures aimed at 
schools, such as assessments used to compare them to district or national 
performance (Woessmann et al. 2009). 
 
In the two national education systems where the existence of external exams varies 
within countries because some regions feature them and others not, Canada and 
Germany, it has similarly been shown that students perform better in regions with 
external exams (see Bishop 1997; Jürges, Schneider and Büchel 2005). Woessmann 
(2010) even shows that the estimated size of the effect of external exit exams does not 
differ significantly between the sample of German states and the sample of OECD 
countries. Another means to increase accountability are school-focused 
accountability systems, which have been shown to increase students’ learning 
achievement in the United States (Hanushek and Raymond 2004; Jacob 2005; Figlio 
and Loeb 2011). 
 
To be sure, designing proper accountability systems that hold actors accountable for 
only those outcomes for which they are really responsible is not an easy task. External 
exit examinations can introduce incentives for students if they produce signals of 
accomplishment that have real consequences for students. Bishop (2006) suggests 
that a well-designed system of external exit examinations should be curriculum-
based, define achievement relative to an external standard, measure across the full 
range of student performance, signal multiple levels of accomplishment, and cover 
the vast majority of students in a given school system. 
 
By contrast, accountability systems that aim to create proper incentives for schools 
require a value-added approach which tests the learning gains (rather than levels) of 
individual students (see Kane and Staiger 2002; Ladd and Walsh 2002). School-
focused accountability systems can also lead to strategic responses by teachers and 
schools, for example increased placements of low-performing students in special-
education programs outside the accountability system or pre-emptive retaining (non-
promotion) of students (Jacob 2005). High-stakes testing may also introduce 
incentives for cheating (Jacob and Levitt 2003). Thus, in designing and 
implementing educational accountability systems, efforts must be made to minimize 
strategic responses and fraud. By contrast, worries about the direct costs of 
implementing accountability systems should not be overstated, as the costs of the 
accountability programs implemented in several US states that include 
comprehensive external testing have been shown to be minuscule relative to overall 




The interaction of external exams and school autonomy 
 
We have thus far treated school autonomy and accountability as unrelated 
institutional features. However, there is reason to expect that accountability and 
school autonomy are complementary, in the sense that one is particularly effective if 
the other is also in place. In particular, external exams and other educational 
accountability mechanisms may provide a common “currency” with which to value 
student achievement that enables autonomous schools to function properly in the 
context of an otherwise decentralized school system (Woessmann 2005a). In the 
economic system, money is an institutional feature that allows one to compare the 
value of different objects. This kind of price system creates information that no single 
individual would be able to gather. In much the same way, external exams can provide 
such price information to the education system. The important feature is that the 
exams are administered by entities external to the individual school, so that they 
provide independent and comparable information on how the school performs. 
Parents can then use this information created by external exams to make appropriate 
choices. With this “price system” in place, a system of decentralized, autonomous 
schools can be expected to work much better than would any centralized system, both 
because the autonomous schools can use their superior local knowledge about how to 
best teach their students and because competition provides them incentives to focus 
their efforts on student learning. 
 
This assertion can be corroborated by evidence from the cross-country pattern of 
student performance. The results show that external exit exams improve educational 
performance, and at the same time that school autonomy is more beneficial in 
systems with external exams (Woessmann 2005a; Fuchs and Woessmann 2007; 
Woessmann et al. 2009). In several decision-making areas, external exams even turn 
an initially negative autonomy effect around into a positive effect. 
 
Figure 2, for example, plots students’ math performance in TIMSS and TIMSS- 
Repeat under the four conditions resulting from the presence and absence of external 
exams and school autonomy over teacher salaries: the performance of students in 
schools without salary autonomy in systems without external exams; with autonomy 
but without external exams; without autonomy but with external exams; and with 
both autonomy and external exams. Performance is measured relative to the 
condition with the lowest performance, which is the condition of salary autonomy 



























Source: Woessmann (2005a). 
 
This is strong evidence of complementarity between accountability and decentralized 
choice. Without the accountability introduced by central exams, schools behave 
opportunistically because their local opportunistic behavior cannot be externally 
observed and thus cannot be sanctioned. Hence school decision- makers do not feel 
obliged to set teacher salaries so as to contribute to enhancing student performance, 
but can use their decision-making autonomy to promote other interests. In contrast, 
central exams provide information about whether the schools perform well or not, so 
that parents and supervisory authorities can draw possible consequences from school 
behavior that weakens performance. This creates incentives for decision-makers in 
schools not to exploit their autonomy in setting teacher salaries in an opportunistic 
way, but to use it in order to effectively promote student performance. The benefits 
of superior local knowledge then come into effect, as school decision-makers ought 
to know better than any central authority which teachers deserve to be rewarded for 
good work. 
 
That is, the accountability introduced by the “price information” of external exams 
creates competition, which brings the beneficial effects of local school choices to the 
fore. Contrasting effects of school autonomy over teacher salaries in school systems 
with and without central exams are found not only in TIMSS and TIMSS- Repeat, but 
also in PISA (Fuchs and Woessmann 2007). Likewise, similar cases where external 
exams turn a negative autonomy effect around into a positive effect have been found 
for such decision-making areas as school autonomy in determining course content 
and teacher influence on resource funding. In their panel analyses of the four PISA 
waves, Hanushek, Link, and Woessmann (2011) confirm that the effect of introducing 
autonomy is more positive in countries that hold the system accountable by central 
exit exams. 
 
In sum, external exams can be regarded as the “currency” of school systems: They are 
a measure of value which prevents decentralized opportunism. As such, they are a 
precondition for decentralized education systems to achieve high student 
performance. Efficient education policies would thus combine external exams with 
autonomous and privately operated schools, setting and testing standards externally 
but leaving it up to schools how to pursue them. Relatively autonomous private 
schools require external accountability, and parents require the information 




Summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed international evidence on the effects of educational freedom, 
conceived broadly to encompass the ability of families to choose privately operated 
schools, the ability of both private and public schools to make autonomous decisions, and 
the availability of information that facilitates well-informed and accountable decisions. 
Studies using student-level data from multiple international achievement tests reveal that 
institutions ensuring competition, autonomy, and accountability within national school systems 
are associated with substantially higher levels of student performance. 
 
The institutional effects we have documented, when combined, add up to a very large 
aggregate impact. For example, when adding the individual effects of these institutional 
features, their effects in TIMSS sum to more than 200 test-score points, compared to an 
international standard deviation of 100 test-score points and to a grade-level equivalent 
of 40 test-score points (Woessmann, 2003a). Similarly, about a quarter of the overall 
international variation in educational performance in PISA can be accounted for by 
variation in the institutional features of participating countries (Fuchs and Woessmann, 
2007).xi 
 
The specific lessons that policymakers can draw from cross-country evidence include that 
students perform better: 
 
• in countries with more competition from privately operated schools; 
 
• in countries where public funding of privately operated schools ensures that all 
families can make choices; 
 
• in schools that have freedom to make autonomous process and personnel 
decisions; 
 
• where external exams holds students and schools accountable; and 
 
• where private operation, school autonomy and external exams are combined.  
 
Evidence based on international comparisons across numerous countries allows 
policymakers in all countries to learn from each other as they attempt to discern what will 
work best in their own education system. At the same time, although it allows us to discern 
broad policy lessons, it has less to say about the design of specific reforms and the details 
of their implementation in particular contexts. Surely, implementation is crucial with any 
of the institutional features discussed, and more nuanced research is needed to learn how 
to implement choice, autonomy, and accountability in different circumstances. 
 
It is also worth emphasizing that choice, autonomy, and accountability are not the only 
relevant institutional features of education systems. For example, Woessmann (2011) 
finds that teacher salary adjustments for outstanding performance are positively related 
to student outcomes across countries in PISA 2003. Similar positive effects of 
performance-related pay have been shown in Israel (Lavy 2002, 2009) and England 
(Atkinson et al. 2009).xii Teacher incentives are particularly crucial because arguably, 
apart from the students themselves, teachers constitute the most important “input” in the 
education process, in terms of both cost and content (see Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 
2005). Another institutional feature with possibly important implications for educational 
performance is the extent of tracking of students into different types of school, which has 
been shown to be associated with increased inequality of student achievement across 
countries (Hanushek and Woessmann 2006). Likewise, the extent of the pre-school 
education system can have a large impact on students’ later learning achievement 
(Schuetz et al. 2008; Schuetz 2009). Thus, interventions at early ages may be particularly 
relevant, given the importance of early childhood investments for later educational 
investments over the life cycle (Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, and Masterov 2006). 
 
When considering how education policies can create the educational achievements 
required for citizens and societies to prosper in the future, institutional reform appears to 
be a more binding constraint than lack of resources. For educational investments to 
translate into student learning, those involved in the education process must face 
incentives that encourage them to act in ways that advance student performance. In our 
view, the international evidence suggests that policies that allow parents to choose 
privately operated schools, give schools autonomy, and provide parents with information 
on student performance have an important role to play in achieving this vision. Not only 














1 By contrast, all studies on international educational performance find strong 
effects of family background on educational performance, with students from better-
educated homes with a higher socioeconomic status performing substantially better 
(see, e.g., Woessmann, 2003a; Schuetz et al. 2008; Hanushek and Woessmann 2011). 
Unfortunately, these aspects of family background are generally less susceptible to 
policy intervention. 
 
2 Exceptions are Canada and Germany, where central exams are a regional feature. 
 
3 See Bishop and Woessmann (2004) for a more elaborate theoretical model of 
institutional effects in education. 
 
4 For methodological details of the econometric techniques, see Woessmann (2003a, 
2003b) and Fuchs and Woessmann (2007). 
 
5The results are only briefly summarized here. For considerably more detail, see 
Woessmann (2002, 2003a) for the results using TIMSS data, Woessmann (2003b) 
for TIMSS-Repeat, Fuchs and Woessmann (2007) and Woessmann (2009b) for 
PISA 2000, Woessmann (2005a) for all three, Woessmann et al. (2009) for PISA 
2003 and Fuchs and Woessmann (2005) for PIRLS 
 
6 See, e.g., Chubb and Moe (1990), Shleifer (1998), Epple and Romano (1998), 
Nechyba (2000) and Gradstein, Justman and Meier (2004). 
 
7These results refer to the OECD countries participating in TIMSS, for whom 
consistent data on the share of private schools are available. 
 
8Using the same research design and data from the 2006 administration of PISA, 
Falck and Woessmann (2012) find that private-school competition not only positively 
affects cognitive test outcomes, but also students’ intentions to become an 
entrepreneur later in life 
 
9 See, e.g., Hoxby (1999), Nechyba (2003), and Bishop and Woessmann (2004). 
 
10 Peterson and West (2003) provide a collection of work on accountability 
 
11 The main part of the remaining international performance variation can be 
attributed to international variation in average student and family background. 
 
12 Atkinson et al. (2009) provide a survey of additional studies on performance-related 
teacher pay, the more rigorous of which also tend to find a positive relationship 
between financial teacher incentives and student outcomes. 
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